

BETWEEN KAJYK AND BARZANI

The founders of KAJYK in 1959 - southern Kurdistan



Political memoranda presented by the General command of the Kurdish party KAJYK in various periods to the General Commander of the Kurdish armed forces, General Mustafa Barzani.

2581 Kurdish, 1969 AC

INTRODUCTION

In the following pages we publish the complete text of some of the political memoranda which our party has presented in various periods to the General Commander of the Kurdish armed forces. General Mustafa Barzani, in Kurdistan.

After having read these documents the reader will not only become aware of the quality of thought, scientific approach and objectivity of our party, but will find in our party a sincere adviser, a wise and able guide for all of our honest Kurds.

The correct ideology, deep-rooted philosophy, powerful arguments and accurate views of our party have prevailed through the predictions it had announced, and all have come true.

We hope that the reader will read the following pages carefully so that he can be a judge and a witness.

KAJYK Party, Europe organisation.

15 January 1969

ON THE CURRENT NATIONAL PROBLEM

Your Excellency brother Mustafa Barzani

Greeting

The new constitution of Arif has made the future policies of the Iraqi rulers quite clear. Briefly, it is seeking a union with the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The question then is, what is the attitude of the Bagdad rulers and in consequence the attitude of the leaders of the United Arab Republic towards our national question?

The position of the Bagdad rulers in the recent past, when they were sharing power with the Ba'athist, does not need any explanation. Moreover, their new constitution which regards the Kurdish people as a part of the "Arab Nation" (1), is clear proof of their present stand towards our nationality. Therefore we do not need much research in order to understand the position of these rulers.

What concerns us apart from the attitude of the Iraqi leaders, is the attitude of the leaders of the United Arab Republic (U. A. R.), particularly Jamal Abdul Nasser.

Is it correct, as Jalal Talabani declared to the newspaper "Khebat"(2), after his return from Europe, that the position of Nasser of Egypt is one of "an understanding patriotic man vis-a-vis the Kurdish question" Also is the statement made by Ibrahim Ahmed on the Bagdad radio and T.V. in 1958 (3)

The answer is no. To show Nasser as a man of understanding towards our Kurdish question is in complete contradiction with reality. In addition it is misleading the Kurdish people and concealing facts from them. We are not going to discuss here the reasons which are pushing the leaders of the K.D.P. (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq) to such a misleading attitude. But we will try to demonstrate our point of view based upon the existing facts in our possession, and examine the position of

Nasser through the investigation of his press adviser Mohammed Hassanein Heikel, who is doubtless far better informed on the ideas of his president than Jalal Talabani and his like. Let us see how Heikel describes the position of Nasser towards the Kurdish question.

On January 28, 1963, Heikel wrote an article in Cairo newspaper "Al-Ahram" on the Kurdish question, expressing the views of his leaders. Because of the nature of the article which highlights the unchanged position of Nasser on the question we feel it is necessary first to extract some of its important paragraphs, then to comment on each of them. Heikel said: " regarding the position of the U. A. R. towards the question Nasser made his opinion clear to Jalal Talabani, when he said: "I would like to say to you first that we are against any separatist movement in any Arab country and the U. A. R. under any circumstances whatsoever and we will resist all such tendencies ... "

What does Nasser mean by "any separatist movement in any Arab country"

Does not this mean implicitly in his view that, Kurdistan which is forcibly annexed to Iraq is a part of the Arab homeland?

Is it possible to qualify such an attitude as one of an "understanding: patriotic man towards our Kurdish question" ? Does not the pretext of separatism provide him with a weapon to fight us whenever he wants?

Let us put this aside, and turn to another statement by Heikel: "in so far as the Iraqi

government primarily recognises the existence of Kurdish nationality, then an armed confrontation, even if it ended in a victory over any local rebellion would not provide a solution to the problem of nationality.”

For the time being, we will not comment on the fact that Heikel has termed our national revolution a “local rebellion”. But we ask all nationals sincere to their nationality to think carefully on the meaning of this text, which is extremely alarming" in so far as the Iraqi government primarily recognises the existence of Kurdish nationality, then an armed confrontation ... etc.

Does that not constitute an advice to the Iraqi government, or any other government, not to recognise at all the existence of a Kurdish nationality.

Does it not mean that the problem is not one of a specific nationality, but rather a problem of citizens living inside the Arab homeland?

We believe that anyone whose mind is free from illusions would answer this question in the affirmative.

This is the position of the Egyptian rulers towards the Kurdish question, and yet they have chosen the peaceful solution to the problem. The question is, what secret is laying behind this choice ?

In his enquiry, Heikel answers the above questions by advancing a set of reasons. We take the 4th paragraph: “in practical terms, the Arab national movement is engaged at the present time, in an armed confrontation in the Yemen, and there is no urgent necessity to engage in another confrontation in the north of the Arab land. Forbearance, even tactical, will give us the possibility of ending an old confrontation before opening up a new one. Otherwise the revolutionary movement will exhaust its energy on secondary confrontations “on multiple fronts”.

It seems to us that their forbearance with respect to another confrontation, in the north of the Arab land, or more precisely the confrontation in Kurdistan, is no more that tactical, and they will pounce on us once they have ended their confrontation in the Arab south. This is in general the position of Nasser of Egypt, the one of an understanding patriotic man towards our question.

It is worth mentioning that Arif proved by his constitution that he is a sincere student of Nasser's. He did not recognise the "Kurds"! as such but only as citizens living in the Arab country, in other words he primarily does not recognise the existence of a Kurdish nationality as Heikel and those who are behind him indicated to Arif.

Then what is the impact of ,Arif's union with the U.A. R. on us, and on the present political forces in the Middle-East?

Certainly with all his energy, Nasser will try to present our question to the world as a question of citizenship. At the same time, he will try to disarm us of the weapons we possess, because he knows that it is easy to eliminate an unarmed people in order to achieve this goal, he will use various pretexts such as separatism, colonialism, atheism, and so on.

As we believe, this will be the consequence of the union for us. What consequences then may it have for the existing forces in the Middle-East? But, before that we may ask the question which forces are important in the Middle-East and what consequences the union may have on this forces?

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNION ON THE EXISTING FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The existing forces in the Middle East in order of importance are the following:

The C.E.N.T.O. states which consist of:

- A. TURKEY. A state of a primary importance in the Middle East. It is certain that the emergence of a powerful Arab state on her frontiers will reduce her importance to a secondary one. In addition, Turkey knows that such an emerging state would dispute the region of Iskenderona with her (4). The Arabs consider it an "Arab region". Moreover the foreign policy of Nasser is disliked by the Turkish rulers, despite the fact that Turkey is a traditional enemy of ours. She dominates a great part of Kurdistan, and she is following our movement with great suspicion and anxiety.
- B. IRAN. Like any other state, Iran is afraid of the rise of a powerful state on her borders, especially an Arab state, headed by Nasser. Its main apprehension is that of losing the oil rich region of Khozistan, which would certainly be the target of Nasser's unionist propaganda, and on the other hand, because its loyalty to the west, Iran is fearful of Nasser's foreign policy and his attempts to foment the leftist element in Iran. Therefore, Iran is the only state among those of the Middle East which will try by all means to fight Nasser. This tendency in Iran's politics, we the Kurds, can exploit in our interest. But we must know that Iran would not do so out of love of us. Iran is the second state that has occupied a great part of our dear homeland. Iran knows that the success of our movement will strengthen the hopes of our brothers for emancipation from her yoke. For this reason, tolerating us in certain matters, is no more than an attempt to preoccupy the Iraqi government and to weaken her in order to pave the way for pro-west elements to seize power, then Iran will stretch out its hand to the new government in Bagdad and both will turn against us (5)
- C. Pakistan: which is very far from our borders, and has no ambitions in our homeland Kurdistan. Therefore it is not necessary to analyse its position.
- D. BRITISH COLONIALISM: It fears generally the growing influence of Nasser in the Arab world and particularly in Iraq. Its traditional policy is to keep "the balance of power" in the region. Her main preoccupations concern her oil resources and her authority in the region, and she fears that she may lose both. Britain is the enemy which has maintained these artificial frontiers by all legal and illegal means. She cannot be trusted because of her long history of repression and betrayal. Therefore great caution should be taken if circumstances put us together on one front.
- E. THE UNITED STATES. The head of the western bloc has the greatest influence in the C. E. N. T. O. alliance. Despite her claim that she understands the nationalist currents in the Arab countries, she adheres to the policy of keeping the "balance of power" between the Arabs and Israel, and the latter has great influence in the U.S.A. The U.S.A. is openly hostile to communism and competes with British colonialism over the hegemony in the region. It encourages disorder and chaos in Iraq in the hope of preparing the situation for a coup d'état, creating a government loyal at least to the west. Our position towards the U.S.A. must be one of caution in the same way as towards British colonialism. Briefly the C.E.N.T.O. alliance represents the greatest power in the Middle East. We should avoid any confrontation with it, at least for the time being, so as to be able to concentrate

our efforts in the event of war, on one front. Having said that, we can benefit from the enmity of the west towards Nasser, on condition that we remain highly aware and conscious, and use our intelligence to avoid being trapped by them.

2. The Ba'athist government in Syria: Its enmity to Nasser and Arif is well known. Its power depends not only on this established government, but also on its party organisations to be found in most Arab countries. Their position towards our question does not differ from that of Nasser, the nationalists and unionists. Our Kurdish people has experienced them. when they were in power in Iraq. However, the Ba'athists are waiting for Arif to renew the fighting against the Kurdish people, so they can be more active in plotting to regain control in Iraq. This will preoccupy Arif's government and will have a weakening influence on Arif's regime which means in turn a strengthening of our position. (6)

3. The state of Israel:

It fears the influence of Nasser as well as the rising of a united Arab state. While it cannot engage directly in fighting it will use its influence in international circles to oppose Nasser and his union.

4. The local communities:

When the Ba'athists in Iraq came to power in 1963 they dealt the communists a fatal blow, which could have been the final one. The party organisations were disintegrated and its leading members were liquidated, as a result of confessions of some communist leaders which showed their cowardliness and hypocrisy their reputation has fallen to its lowest level. But we have to know that communist organisations in Kurdistan come out generally intact from the trial. Many of them have come under the protection of our revolutionary forces, and recently they have recovered their strength and are: openly active. We have to be careful about allying ourselves with them for three reasons:

A. A study of their philosophy and the experiences of political parties allied to them shows clearly that the communist alliance with non-communists is no more than a tactical plan. Through it, they want to control the entire movement and push it in a direction which suits their goals.

B. To ally ourselves with them means the enmity of the C.E.N.T.O. allies against us, a situation which we have to avoid at the present time at least. We have already explained the reasons in the first paragraph.

C. The communists do not believe in nationalist theories which should be the basis of an all nationalist movements, and for that reason their policies subordinate nationalist interest to international interests, with "Moscow" as a directing centre. It is quite obvious that taking advice from a foreign capital will turn us into a satellite of that capital and will force us to abandon our interests if they should oppose the interests of that capital. On this occasion we would like to mention Khrushchev's visit to Cairo in this very days and we have to extract here another paragraph of the already mentioned article by Heikel as it is related to our present subject. Heikel mentions the reasons which impose the "peaceful solution" to the Kurdish question he says: "It is in the interest of Iraq, after the events of 8 February, 1963... etc. to improve its relations with the Soviet Union". Then Heikel goes on to explain: "concerning the political strategy, the

Arab-Soviet friendship should be maintained constantly and all remaining obstacles, which inevitably cause friction, should be eliminated."

Does that not mean that Nasser will try in his meeting with the Soviet leaders to clear the atmosphere between the Soviets and the Iraqi rulers, moreover, is he not trying to make Arif and his clique agree to suspend hostilities with the Iraqi communists? In this latter case, if hostilities are suspended and pressure on Iraqi communists are lightened, -won't the communists, as they did during Kasim's rule, attack our revolution once again under the pretext that it weakens the national government, and is harmful to Iraqi unity. Yes, this probability is worth taking into consideration, although we are not saying that its occurrence is certain. (8) But what we are certain of, is the closer Moscow comes with the so-called "liberated states" in the fields of foreign policy, the closer will be the links between the local communists and the rulers of those states, which include the Iraqi governors. Anyway, the probability that Moscow may sacrifice the Iraqi communists cannot be excluded. On this occasion we would like to remind you of a frequently repeated slogan by the Iraqi communists, expressed whenever they saw that the nationalist movements were opposing their goals and hopes. This is the slogan of "sacrifice of the part for the whole" and by the interest of the "whole" they mean the interest of the international communist, and that nationalist movements should be sacrificed to it. It is also obvious that the communists and their students consider the nationalist movements to be a part of the communist movement.

This is our analyse of the political situation in general, and as you will see it is a realistic study of all political forces in our region. We have not favoured anyone of them unless and above all, our national interest demands. You certainly will notice our critical attitude to both, east and west camps alike, and also you will notice that we have specified the 'tactical meeting points' and "strategic differences" in our relations with each of them in a courageous way which does not exist among the hesitating bourgeoisie parties.

OUR DUTIES IN THIS STAGE

After these clarifications, we may ask ourselves what are our duties in these decisive historical circumstances?

In the face of such a situation do we have to remain inactive and accept fate? The answer is never. Our duties oblige us at the next possible occasion to study and specify our position, taking into consideration all sudden changes which may occur in the near future. (9) So we ask you to hold a general conference of all personalities, nationalists, militarists, party members and non-party members. If you agree, we suggest the following questions to be presented to the Conference as a basis for the discussion:

1. Arif's new constitution does not recognize our nationalist rights as a nation which has its own land and language, but instead considers Kurdistan as a part of Arab homeland, this is so clear that no one can dispute it. After heavy casualties and sacrifice of 2 years, do you accept that ?
2. If you do not agree with the constitution, what then must our position be? Do we have to declare war without preparation? Or do we have to explain our position in political memoranda to all international political forces, preparing the way for declaring the revolution again? Is it sufficient to write only memoranda without backing them by

positive steps?

3. If you do not agree to renew fighting, do you think that the enemy will not attack us without declaration, as it did the last time? and what is the basis of such a belief? (10)
4. And if the enemy attacked us despite that, are we ready to deter him? For example, is our organisation safe and our unity solid? If the answer is negative is it not time to prepare for all emergencies?
5. The constitution has opened the way for the Union, especially with Nasser. Do you think that the union will keep silent with regard to our armed forces in the "North of the Arab homeland" as they call it, and if the Union does not accept that, and uses the presence of our armed forces as a pretext to attack us, what will then be your position?
6. Nasser has said that he will fight all separatist movements in any part of the Arab homeland. Will he will not attack us, given that he believes that Kurdistan is a part of the Arab homeland.
7. Heikel, the press adviser of Nasser said:
"As far as the Iraqi government primarily recognises the existence of a Kurdish nationality, the fighting is in vain ... etc." Does that mean the fighting is useful if the Iraqi government does not recognise the existence of a Kurdish nationality, as Arif's constitution states?
8. If fighting is imposed upon us, or we choose to fight, do we enter the war with the same old slogans or should we review them again; and if we decided to change our political slogans what are then the new slogans with which we will enter the war? Regardless of what might be the answers during the conference, we will try to answer the questions in a general way, paying especial attention to the 8th question *at* the end of this chapter.

A. We firmly believe that keeping silent on the new constitution is tantamount to recognition on our part that "Kurdistan is a part of the Arab homeland" and this means that the sacrifice of our martyrs for the recognition of our existence as a nation with its own land, history and language has been in vain. We believe, we are responsible before hi story and before the future generations which will never forgive us.

B. Our silence and our adoption of a peaceful solution will not save us, as the wolf never respects the silence of the lamb and its peaceful nature. Is it logical that they accept the presence of our armed forces "The Kurdish Revolutionary Army" in a territory they consider to be part of Arab homeland? The answer is no. Certainly once they overcome their problems, they will try to disarm us, and when this realised God forbid, then it is easier for them to settle the account definitively with our people.

Perhaps what Dr. Abdul Rahman Al-bezaz said and which Roz Al Yousif review published on July, 1969 sufficiently illustrates their dirty intention. Bazad said: "If we behaved like others behave the Kurdish question would have been ended in a few days, by the transfer of Kurds to the South and transfer of Arab tribes to the North. But we never believe in racial and ethnical coercion... etc". You perhaps know that this "Arab tolerance" which Bazaz shows towards the "behaviour of the others" was not in those days at July, 1963 a "Tolerance" of someone who does not believe in racial and ethnical coercion as he claimed. In those days the Ba'athist authority did not extend beyond the limits of the big cities and it is well known that, cities isolated from their surroundings, during the revolutionary period will not attract people to settle here.

Moreover deporting the civilians in Bazaz's way will not solve the problem. Furthermore the international circumstances were not encouraging for that. But things become quite different if our revolutionary forces were obliged to lay down their arms, then we would see that the behaviour of Bazaz and his followers' if not more harsh, would not differ from that of the others. Are not the terrible massacre of women, children, elderly people and the violation of the safety of innocents' examples of their "Arab tolerance".

- C. For the above mentioned reasons we ask you to take without delay, the following steps:
1. The military administration, political and economic affairs of the revolution, which have been disrupted recently must be reorganised on a solid scientific basis, and our revolutionary forces put on the alert, ready to go into action at any moment.
 2. The first step should be accompanied by a political step, which consists of sending political memoranda to the super powers and to international organisations explaining the non-recognition by the new constitution of our national rights, the rights for which we have declared the revolution, and pointing out that the constitution is showing the future intentions of the Iraqi rulers towards our people. We have to form our arguments on the basis of Arif's previous statements which are concretising in his new constitution. We must particularly make clear that "Kurdistan" which is annexed to Iraq is not a part of the "Arab homeland", and that when we demand autonomy within the framework of Iraqi unity, it does not mean that we have given up "Kurdistan" which we consider our homeland and not a part of the homeland of others. We should also remind the world in our memoranda that we refuse peace at the expense of our national dignity, and that the Iraqi government alone is responsible for the consequences of not recognising our right.

Concerning the rumours that there is foreign pressure on both sides to halt fighting regardless of the source and the degree of such pressure, we confirm our adherence to our national rights without bowing our heads to anybody at the expense of our rights and dignity.

If the fighting is renewed we have to promote our cause from an internal to an international one.

Finally there is another important point to which we must pay special attention; we have to reconsider our aims' and also the political methods so as to be adapted to the new situation. We have above all to ask ourselves: Why do our enemies try to make our revolutionary movement an internal affair? and why do they insist on not recognising us as a nation and consider the 'Kurds living in Iraq' as citizens living inside the Arab homeland?

A careful look at this policy will clarify the enemy's fear of our question developing into an international one, and its transformation from an internal level to broad international dimensions which may bring sudden changes, that the enemy may not be able to confront. Hence our national interest obliges us to thwart their plans by going beyond the old stage and declaring the 'Formation of Provisional autonomic Government' under the name of 'provisional autonomic Government of Kurdistan' and to ask the Iraqi government to recognise it within 6 months, or even less.

Also we have to make the condition that should the Iraqi government not recognise this step within the time limit, and then the revolutionary command has the right to invite act sincere Kurdish patriots to form a National Liberation Front. This front would elect from its members a Committee of Revolutionary Command. This committee has the right to declare Kurdish Provisional Government and to be elected among its members, and to ask all governments to

recognise it. This provisional government should immediately send its representatives abroad, or authorise the Kurds living abroad to represent it, and to contact world states and international organisations in order to obtain their political and material support for the Kurdish Provisional Government.

SUMMERY

With all sincerity and objectivity we have presented to you our ideas, hoping that you who are known as a sincere and far-seeing man, will examine them. As for us, we remain active in secrecy. We pray God to help you in your noble task.

Peace to those who listened to the advice and followed the best of it.

KAJYK 13/7/1964

KAJYK Leadership

A brief note on the current negotiations

Brother Mustafa Barzani.

Greetings.

We have been informed from certain sources that negotiations, between you and the government delegate will take place. These negotiations concern limitation of the national rights of the Kurdish people. On this occasion we would like to present you some notes about the negotiations as we are representing the national side of the existing Kurdish revolution.

We know that you are going to present the project of the Province of Kurdistan to the Iraqi government. Although we do not know the context of the project, we would like to emphasise the following points.

- A. If the project is the same one as was presented to the government last year during the Ba'athist rule, we consider it as a minimum to which no more concessions can be added. We would also like to emphasise that our national ambition will not be realised with such a project, but for the time being we consider it as a step toward that ambition which want cease until the independence of entire Kurdistan's proclaimed.
- B. We find it necessary to emphasise that the above mentioned project should include the district of Sulaymania, Kirkuk and Arbil in addition, the Kurdish regions annexed to Mosul and Diyala districts. The Kurdishness of these regions must be emphasised and no concessions on any part whatsoever are acceptable.
- C. The project of a Kurdish Province which is under discussion will not be viable if it does not enjoy both legislative and executive powers. The latter should include all the decentralised administrative powers. Mainly all measures exercised by virtue of the executive power including employment dismissal and transfer... etc. should be on the authority of the legislative power in the province.
- D. The best guarantee for these mights is in without doubt the presence of our armed forces under whatever title it might be, on condition that these forces remain under the sincere Kurdish Command.

Note

We have learned that some of the defeatists are trying to influence you under the pretext of sincerity for the Kurdish People in order to make you accept some symbolic administrative rights, such as, the construction in the North, employing Kurds in the civil administration, and other trivial symbolic measures. In fact this is tantamount to an organised gradual withdrawal from the objectives of the revolution. We consider such attempts are motivated by the ill-intention of the defeatists, listening to them means in your part a breach of faith towards the Kurdish people and as rendering useless the bloodshed of our martyrs. It is also an attempt by those very elements to raise doubts about your reputation and sincerity, thus strengthening the arguments of your enemies. Therefore your national duty obliges you to denounce such elements and never listen to their ill-intentioned arguments which consist of "Crying over the burned villages and homeless families" etc. It is the same argument which is frequently repeated in the enemy camp.

Finally we wish you with all our hearts all success in your dangerous task, praying God to bring about victory and peace to our Kurdish people. And it comes in Quran: And say act, "will then God and the believers will see your actions".

Peace be upon those who follow the true Path

23.8.1964

Brother Mustafa Barzani

General Commander of the armed Kurdish partisans.

Greetings.

In order to enforce direct contact between our party and yourself, we decided to tackle our future relations on a frank and open basis. Here follows a presentation of our ideas in the form of summarised points so as to make the subject easier for discussion.

1. History shows us that the existence of nationalist parties is a historical necessity for every people, not only for its independence and unity but also to maintain its historical entity and its livelihood. Hence we can see among many peoples including those that have already gained independence that they have retained their own nationalist parties and have never given them up. Furthermore, some of these peoples on account of their specific circumstances have two nationalist parties or even more, e. g. the Arab nation. In our case as a divided nation, its national identity has been fought against for centuries. Do you consider having a nationalist party like ours is unjustified whilst other peoples have many nationalist parties?

Certainly you will say no.

2. However, some may say that the K. D. P. is a nationalist party. This is absolutely not true. Anyway here we are not going to analyse all non-nationalist conceptions and slogans which the K. D. P. believes in, because we have already done that briefly in KAJYK book in July but will among its slogans analyse one as an example.

Obviously the leaders of the K.D.P. are proud of the slogan "Common Struggle" (13) and they call that the "Open Kurdish Nationalism and the common struggle which in the end

means "Class Struggle" is in turn the cornerstone of the communist theory. But the leaders of the K. D. P. have neither the frankness nor the courage of the communists. Therefore we see them masking their intentions with deformed borrowed slogans. By this we do not mean that we should put the class struggle completely aside; what we mean is that a party whose solution to the national question depends on the common struggle cannot be called a national party, and as far as it believes in that it has no right to resort in isolation to armed struggle. Instead it should be like the communists, a mass party composed of many nationalities to launch its common struggle due to its recognition of the unity of the problems of these masses, and in consequence their unity in struggle.

3. In addition we knew that the leaders of the K. D. P. who pretend to be your sincere supporters and being protected by you is no more than a provisional tactic. Its aim was to gain supporters, but the situation at the time was not yet so clear. Some of our brothers thought that your indifference to some of their ideas and slogans was a proof of your consent and your participation. But the first difference which arose between you and the group of Hemza Abdallah to a certain extent did put an end to such speculation. We were hoping at the time that you would purge the party definitively of all non-nationalist elements, thus paving the way for the engagement of the nationalists. The nationalist elements at the time were not yet organised as a nationalist party. But when, instead you stopped in the middle of the road as you left the partners of Hemza Abdallah and his students in the ranks of the party, the time has proved that they were no more nationalist than their teacher, they were active in submerging the party in alien concepts as had been the case in the past.

In order to isolate the nationalist elements they have embarked in fighting all nationalist ideas with unfounded accusations, in consequence, the nationalists reacted quickly in organising themselves in a nationalist party.

4. Meanwhile the K. D. P. leaders did not disturb the Communists and others, but persecuted and imprisoned the nationalists; they even plotted to assassinate some of them. If the plot failed, this was primarily due to the great awareness of the Peshmergah, those noble soldiers whose sense of nationalism prevented them from killing their brothers whose only crime was that they were nationalists.

Although we have other examples but we do not want to mention them here. We also bore all that persecution without putting the responsibility on you and that despite your presidency of this party up to now, simply because we were aware of the hidden conflict growing between you and the K.D.P. leaders, and because we knew that once the leadership of the K. D. P. was convinced of his power, it would do without you and declare war against you.

As we have said before, because this leadership is a continuation of Hemza leadership and that your purge of the party was not complete.

5. And what we expected has happened; the leadership of the K. D. P. has risen against you, claiming that you have attempted to "liquidate the revolution". Many dangerous accusations have been made against you which aroused the anger of simple-minded people, the leadership of the party went on in their dirty propaganda, even going so far as to turn Soranis against Barzanis, describing the Barzanis as "Adventive Barzanis"

repeating the same suspected slogans and propagating hated regionalism which revives the hopes of the occupier enemy. These activities in fact revealed the nature of what they call their "Progressiveness".

In this they were helped by not having another organised group backing you and which could confront them, or explain to the people your own views, or at least reveal to the people the deep hidden reasons behind those differences. In such polluted atmosphere by lies and propaganda, we consider it a duty to confront their misleading propaganda, defeat their hated regionalism and unmask their false progressiveness.

6. For this reason we put out our manifesto of 31 March 1964 on the latest differences between Barzani and the K. D. P. leadership, which for the first time revealed the real causes of these differences. These could be traced back to the distant past, and have nothing to do with the present cease-fire at all, we refuted their attempts, to narrow down the dispute to the cease-fire and also exposed the scandalous methods of this opportunist group. (We send you a copy of the manifesto at that time). The manifesto had a great impact on many sincere Kurds who little by little begun to be suspicious of their empty claims.

At a time when many of the central committee members were running away from responsibility, we enjoined our supporters and friends in the ranks of the Peshmergah to rally around you and your supporters.

7. And when we saw the incapacity and weak organisation of the committees you formed in the cities, and felt the change in the political circumstances we sent you a political memorandum concerning the current situation. It included the following points:
 - A. To hold a party conference in order to get out of the prevailing chaos, and to strengthen the new committees through election of a new party leadership.
 - B. In the event fighting would resume we suggested for the first time the formation of an autonomous government and a Revolutionary Command Council.
 - C. We predicted that the Iraqi government would move towards unification and we analysed Nasser's attitude vis-a-vis the Kurdish question.
 - D. We also predicted the rapprochement between the Iraqi government and the communists the latter have started to play their old song of "National Rule" and praise the progressive stand of the government towards socialism.
 - E. We predicted the Iranian enmity towards the Arab Union and towards Nasser. Recently the Shah of Iran has openly started attacking the U.A.R. and Nasser.
 - F. We said that Israel which acted as there were a truce with Iraq under "Kasim" and the "Ba'ath" would concentrate its attacks on Bagdad once the latter approached Nasser. That prediction has come true also.
8. And then once you held the sixth party conference, we supported your undertakings and wished you success in your actions. The position of our friends was tough towards the "Ousted Central Committee". This contrasts with the position of the other members of the conference, who were pro-reconciliation and mutual understanding, which reflects the infiltration in their minds of the non-nationalist concepts preached by "Hemze Abdallah-Ibrahim Ahmad" during the whole period of their control over the party.

Without doubt it is under the influence of such non-nationalist ideas that the members of the conference have elected individuals such as Habib Karim and Fuad Jelal, and others

whose ways of thinking is similar to that of Ibrahim Ahmad who in turn is no different from his teacher Hemze Abdallah. The earlier expulsion of Hemzeh but not his students and obedient followers, did not solve the question. In the same way purge of Ibrahim Ahmad and his group from the party will not solve the problem, since his students control the party at present.

9. We nevertheless did not show disapproval of the election of such persons at the time, because we did not want to be accused of disturbing the activities of the others or of criticising others for our own ends. For that reason we preferred to see their actions and gather enough information on their moves. We know from our intelligence service among the ranks of the dissensionists that the new leadership has a secret plan to restore control by their old friends over the party and the armed forces. The plan can be summarised as follows:
 - A. To transfer elements loyal to you in the armed forces especially in the vital posts, and to replace them by elements loyal to themselves. This will coincide with the replacement of party members loyal to you by supporters whose real loyalty is covert in the party.
 - B. To expulse nationalist elements in the ranks of both the party and the Peshmergah. First by destroying their reputation and second by various unfounded accusations against them so as to isolate them and turn public opinion against them.
10. The same previous source has confirmed to us that the executors of the plan are the members of the present central Committee, who are taking full advantage of your consent to measures. Moreover they will try to use the Barzanis before other sections of people against the nationalists. At the same time they will try through their infiltrated agents among the people to repeat the anti-Barzani propoganda such as “The alien Barzanis” and to form an image of you as a person whose friendship and integrity are not to be trusted, so that they can destroy your reputation and at the same time purge the party of those elements who are blocking their plans. As you will realise it is a very dangerous plan.
11. On this occasion, we would like to mention a bitter reality which might not be known to you, namely the support of most Kurdish organisations, such The Youth, Students, and Teachers for the ousted central Committee. This fact might be deliberately hidden from you by the flatterers in the present Central Committee. It goes without saying that opposing nationalist elements will strengthen the position of such dissident elements who continue to accuse you of so much of treachery.
12. While we recognise that they outnumber us, this does not mean that we are unable to confront them in all fields for we are privileged in the quality and solidity of our elements, our advanced organisation, strong convincing principles and scientific arguments. The Quran says “And how often has a group of few defeated multitude by God's will”. But all we want is to avoid clashing with you, not only because they will benefit from such a confrontation but also because we consider the Barzanis to be an example of an organised, disciplined army, excellent in keeping secrets and who deserve the respect of all sincer patriots.

So we present you with these practical suggestions which can be a basis of strong ties between us in the future if God will. We ask you to study them and give them serious attention:

A. It is obvious that the government of Arif or any other Iraqi government will not recognise our rights to complete autonomy unless harsh circumstances impose such recognition which Bagdad government cannot resist. This means that future Iraqi governments will plot against any right that was recognised in the past, whenever the circumstances that brought about such recognition have changed. Therefore we believe that should we obtain autonomy we nevertheless should maintain a "secret movement" and a "secret organised army".

These measures we believe are correct and the necessity of maintaining national gains imposes such steps, while at the same time the K. D. P. will act openly under the eyes of the enemy through its leaders, organisations and projects.

If you agree on this point we can start now to take the necessary steps in such a double-action. (We will give you the details of the plan when you want to know it in the future).

B. Should fighting resume, we believe that the current central Committee will take advantage of your preoccupation with the war to fight and persecute us, and as you know they are unable to do that without using your name and influence.

In the event of war, the national interest must be placed above all other considerations. Therefore, to avoid any confrontation with us, we propose that you allow us to establish a military base, in condition that we are connected with you directly. We have no objections to one or more of our Barzanis brothers as your permanent representatives in our base, because we have confidence on their sincerity and nobility. But if you accept our proposal in article (a) then we will not need a military base.

C. In case you also refuse our second suggestion, we propose that at least you recognise us in one way or another. These were some urgent current proposals which we have presented to you in all frankness. For the victory of our just cause and to raise the name of Kurdistan high among the peoples of the planet we are always ready to serve the revolution with the most precious that we possess.

Peace be upon you.

KAJYK Leadership

7.12.1964

About the situation in Sulaymaniya

Kurdistan for the Kurds

Equality for the people

Your Excellency Mustafa Barzani.

Greetings

The current events sweeping Sulaymaniya are the work of those who call themselves the group of the old political bureau, unfiltered among the ranks. of Peshmergah and the party. This

situation is in danger of affecting our future relations, with you in particular and on the future of the revolution in general.

With the help of their covert friends in your party, these elements began to occupy important posts in both the party and the armed forces "Peshmergah". Moreover they have started in different ways, openly or clandestinely to quarrel with our supporters in order to dominate the city of Sulaymaniya entirely.

Here we explain to you some general aspects of this plan and present some proposals so that to avoid any consequences which no sincere Kurd wishes to see happen:

1. On February 10, 1965 one of these plotters stated to a friend of our trying to win him to his side that their block is constantly gaining ground, and they will fight anyone who stands in their way including Barzani himself. Their first step is to eliminate the nationalists by turning them and the communists against one another. The nationalists should think that the communists have aggressed against their comrades. In this way both the nationalists and the communists will kill each other. This will pave the way for their firm control of the situation, since they have covert supporters among the news central committee, the plotter asked our partisan to take an oath not to disclose this secret, and wanted him to join them. (We can prove all that by evidence to whoever wishes to know).

2. A week later, during the night, this group attacked your own representative the assistant Shewket Ismael while he was on duty, they stated clearly to him that they would crush all those who stood in their way and in the way of the old political bureau.

3. After the discovery of these elements who attacked houses in the night and spread insecurity among the innocent population. Then they began to seek out our supporters and attack them in the night and spread rumours against them.

4. We have been informed from our private sources that they listed the names of some of our supporters to be assassinated, and strangely enough they claimed that this order was decreed by you.

5. What is happening in Sulaymanyia is not only carried out by this group but the Iraqi intelligence service is actively involved in such events. We know for certain that a group of government agents is trying to approach the dissident members of the party, and offering support to them. This is in fact a plot designed by the Iraqi military intelligence office. The aim is to create chaos and panic among the people and to combat national elements who are a real abstract in their way. (We know the heads of such spies and plotters and are able to help those who are interested).

Confronted with such a dishonourable plan we cannot keep silent. Although we could have resisted them by all means, nevertheless we instructed our friends, to freeze their activities in order not to encourage bloodshed and not to widen the gap in the differences among people, because the main winner will be the occupier enemy.

Therefore we suggest that you take the necessary steps to control the situation, otherwise we cannot control our friends who have begun to feel unable to bear such provocations, and then no one could blame us for having reacted. We again ask you to nominate someone whose neutrality and honesty is beyond doubts, so that the situation can be saved by his wisdom and

intelligence. (We are able to reveal the names of those who wanted to hunt in the troubled water, to destroy the reputation of national elements and the other sincere people who are supporting the revolution.

Our best greeting to you

KAJYK Leadership

21.2.1965


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1. The constitution states that Iraq is part of the Arab homeland. Its people is a part of the Arab nation. Its official language is Arabic only and the desire of Iraq is total Arab unity starting with the U.A.R.
2. The newspaper of KDP
3. Look at Al-Jomhuriya the Bagdad newspaper of 11.8.1958.
4. This prediction has come true as Mohammad Al-dorra himself recognises in his book entitled "The Kurdish Question" written in Arab. He said: "If to what has preceded we add the decision of the Arab Lawyers Conference held at Bagdad on December 10, 1964, that Arabistan, Iskenderun and Kilikiya are integral parts of the Arab homeland and the Arab people..." we will realise the great influence of these untimely words, written with little sense of the national and nationalist responsibilities, and which have absolutely no meaning in practical terms in pushing the Kurdish revolution in the North towards unprecedented new stage, which during the whole period of modern history of Iraq has not attained. Page 357-358.
5. This prediction has also come true. The Iranian government cooperated with the Ba'ath government against the Kurdish revolution in 1963. See the book of Mohammod Al-dorra page 406. The Iranian government provided Iraqi army with information about the moves of the Kurdish partisans. Iran changed its position of hostility when the unionist government of Arif come to power in Iraq. Regarding the Kurdish question it is important to make distinction between the Iranian ruling class supporting the west and national elements among the Persian people who believe in the Aryan brotherhood. The first group changes position according to the circumstances while the position of the second one is based on principles.
6. This prediction has come true also. The Ba'ath Party clandestine was trying to exploit the political and military crisis in Iraq since it come to power on July 17, 1968.
7. This prediction has come true also, the Iraqi communist party published a " manifesto in mid-September 1964 (4 months after presenting this memorandum). It concerned the (Progressive governor of Arif) it stated: "The progressive steps taken by Arif's government associated with some ministerial changes in state posts are generally in the interest of consolidating the positions of nationalist anti-colonialist forces" the manifesto called upon the masses: "to march on road of unity, liberty and

socialism” in other word to fulfil the slogan at Arab resurrection.

The manifesto was diffused under the title - The Iraqi Communist Party calls for determination and serious action to annihilated colonialist plots.

8. Arif did not approach the Iraqi communists the way Kasim did. Instead he developed relations directly with Moscow, and the Soviet Union according to the Marxist formula at scarifying the part for the while gave up the question of Iraqi communists. Some Iraqi communists published a pamphlet in late August 1964 in which they criticised the Central Committee of the party for its allegiance to the policy of Arif's government which is a nationalist bourgeoisie hostile to the Iraqi people and particularly to Kurdish people. In such a situation the communists could not often support to Arif's government.
9. This prediction has totally come true. Arif carried out the policy of procrastination in dealing with Kurds until suddenly attacked Kurdistan on March 11, 1964 using napalm bombs and chemical weapons which are internationally banned.
10. The enemy did attack suddenly.



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